INTRODUCTION
Police pursuit and emergency response has become a very controversial topic at the national, state and local levels. Civil action against law enforcement agencies concerning pursuit has increased, and many administrators are being forced to develop emergency response/pursuit policies or revise existing policies. The safety of innocent third parties, the officers and the suspected violators has become a major consideration in potential pursuit situations. The same may be said of emergency response situations where high speeds are inevitable and often a necessity. Serious injury, property damage and death often result from pursuits and/or emergency responses. Some pursuit proponents feel it is necessary to prevent potentially dangerous criminals from eluding police, committing more crimes and driving recklessly. These supporters believe law enforcement would be drastically hindered without pursuit.
While encouraging all pursuits hardly seems practical, abolishing all pursuits does not seem to be a logical solution either. Possibly, a continuum could be used to demonstrate varying philosophies. At the lowest end would be the total abolishment of each and every pursuit. At the highest end of the pursuit continuum would be the thought that all pursuits are necessary. A philosophy falling somewhere along the midpoint may serve safety concerns. Pursuits may be necessary to protect the public, but these same pursuits often endanger the public. Limitations must be imposed on the need to apprehend violators and the need to serve the public safely.
DEFINITIONS
Pursuit has been defined in various ways (Alpert and Fridell, 1992, p. 124; Nugent et al., 1990; Scafe and Round, 1970, p. 11) . For the purposes of this research, a simplified definition of pursuit from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (1989, p . 1) will be used. Pursuit will be defined as:
An active attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive tactics.
Emergency response is defined as answering a call to provide assistance as soon as possible in potential emergency situations (e. g. burglaries, auto accidents, fires, robberies etc.). Except in those few states that allow a silent approach when necessary for officer safety, the officer in an emergency response mode is usually required by law to make use of emergency equipment (lights and siren) and drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. Whether or not officers are operating with due regard for the safety of others is a growing topic of concern as civil suits alleging wrongful death or injury increase (Barker, 1984) .
LITERATURE REVIEW
The amount and quality of literature available on pursuit issues has received much criticism. Having been characterized by some writers as "conspicuously deficient" and "methodologically flawed" (Alpert and Fridell, 1992) , existing studies continue to lack sound empirical foundation. However, there has been some useful research on this topic. We will not attempt a complete literature review; excellent reviews have appeared elsewhere (see Alpert and Fridell, 1992) .
The Physicians for Automotive Safety (1968) published the first report dealing with the negative aspects of pursuit. Some of the more pertinent findings included the following: one out of five pursuits ended in death; five out of ten ended in serious injury; seven out of ten ended in accidents; one out of every 25 persons killed was a law enforcement officer; four out of five pursuits were for minor offenses; and pursuits caused more than 500 deaths each year (Physicians for Automotive Safety, 1968, p. 99) . The report, although methodologically flawed, created commotion throughout the law enforcement community.
Following this report, Fennessy et al. (1970, p. 100) attempted to show that the physicians may have arrived hastily at their conclusion. Through the use of a public opinion survey, the researchers focused on the public's response to pursuit driving. A random sample of the driving population of Fairfax County, Virginia, was questioned about pursuit driving and the penalties for fleeing from the police. Their findings contradicted many of the findings in the Physicians for Automotive Safety study.
The early 1980s brought about a new exploratory study performed by the California Highway Patrol (CHP). This 1983 study was limited to a six-month period and gathered information from freeway incidents only. All CHP pursuits and all pursuits of ten cooperating law enforcement agencies were documented on survey forms prepared by the researchers. The CHP analyzed nearly 700 pursuits. Of the 683 pursuits conducted: 198 (29 percent) resulted in accidents, 99 (11 percent) resulted in injuries and 7 (1 percent) resulted in deaths; 429 (63 percent) were initiated for traffic offenses, 179 (26 percent) were initiated for DUI and 75 (11 percent) were initiated for serious criminal activity; 243 (36 percent) pursuits were voluntarily terminated by the driver and 27 (4 percent) were voluntarily terminated by the officer (California Highway Patrol, 1983, pp. 101-2) . Britz and Payne (1994) attempted to identify disparities in opinions/perceptions among different job types within a large statewide agency. The study involved a survey of 2,220 sworn officers experienced in road patrol. The questionnaire consisted of 64 questions and was limited to pursuits as defined by departmental policy. They also included variables for training and supervision. It was found that road officers were more likely to view departmental policy as restrictive and agree that policy discourages pursuit. Conversely, the researchers found administrators were the least likely to view the policy as overly restrictive. The researchers also noticed some implications dealing with training and supervision of the police administrators and policy makers. Of the administrators, 51 percent did not feel they had been adequately trained or instructed in pursuit policy, and 56 percent of the patrol officers indicated likewise. In addition, 35 percent of the department personnel were found to be involved in unreported pursuits. Charles et al. (1992) noted pursuit policy and police liability concerns in their report to the AAA foundation. The study, sponsored by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety and the Illinois State Police, represented the results of a one year study on Illinois police pursuits. The study, conducted from January through December of 1991, had a sample of 51 police agencies. On the policy issue they recommended that:
Police agencies should develop policies and procedures that are highly restrictive of police pursuits. However, despite the restrictiveness of pursuit policies, officer training and supervision, accidents will still occur.
In a detailed analysis of 286 police pursuits in Illinois, Auten (1990, p. 11 ) focused on virtually every aspect of pursuit. Ranging from day of week to weather conditions to vehicle speed, he was able to break down a vast number of pursuit factors. Accounting for variations in department size (e.g. state v. metropolitan v. county police), Auten reached some generalized conclusions concerning Illinois police pursuits, including that "approximately 30-40 percent of pursuits involve traffic collisions." Kennedy et al. (cited in Homant and Kennedy, 1994 ) conducted a study of pursuit policies for 47 states as well as the 24 largest municipal police departments in the country. Their purpose was to survey the comprehensiveness and types of policies. They found a continuum could be used effectively to classify all of the policies they received. The far left of the continuum began with "pure judgment", where the officer had maximum discretion. The far right of the continuum ended with "pursuit discouraged", where the officer had minimum discretion. Among the cities surveyed, those with higher population densities had more restrictive policies.
PURPOSE
A majority of the existing literature involved some examination of pursuit policy. However, there were no available data regarding the relationship between demographic variables and policy type for police and sheriffs' departments in a particular state. The purpose of this research is to present the results of a descriptive study of police and sheriffs' departments in the state of Alabama with regard to emergency response/pursuit driving policy. The authors examined the following variables:
• number of sworn officers;
• existence of emergency response and pursuit driving policies;
• perceived degree of policy restrictiveness on officer discretion; and
• training in forcible stop techniques.
METHODOLOGY
The study used a content analysis of submitted policies and a selfadministered, mailed 18 item questionnaire. The population consisted of all Alabama police and sheriffs' departments. The population was determined by referencing the State of Alabama Law Enforcement Directory (1994) and consisted of 389 law enforcement agencies, 322 police departments and 67 sheriffs' departments. The questionnaire was mailed directly to chiefs and sheriffs and asked that they personally fill out the questionnaire. The initial mailing date was November 24, 1994. As the questionnaires were returned, a chart was kept for the purpose of identifying those departments responding. This process allowed for a computation of the return rate, but most importantly it aided in the identification of a follow-up mailing. On January 13, 1995, the first follow-up mailing was sent. The third and final mailing was sent February 13, 1995, and a final cut-off date of March 11, 1995 was established. Survey results were then recorded and tabulated. The authors did not imply that the questionnaires would be anonymous due to the inclusion of clearly visible record locator numbers. Furthermore, the authors did not believe that this would affect external validity based on the authors' familiarity with the survey population and previous research efforts in this state using the same format. Moreover, no questions asked for data that might be embarassing.
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF RETURNED POLICIES
A total of 188 departments responded and 52 (28 percent) returned copies of their emergency response/pursuit policies. As the departments increased in size, so did the number of policies returned. Departments with 0-11 sworn officers had the lowest percentage of returned policies with 12 out of 92 departments responding (a 13 percent return rate). Departments with 100 or more sworn officers had the highest percentage of returned policies with ten of 11 departments responding (a 91 percent return rate).
Data on emergency response policies were somewhat limited, as the returned policies involved pursuit issues more so than emergency response issues specifically. While departments indicated the existence of an emergency response policy, they often included emergency response "guidelines" as a subsection of their overall pursuit policy. Content analysis revealed some common variables and patterns of policy frameworks.
The most prominent variable concerned the duty to operate an emergency vehicle with regard for the safety of all persons using the highways. Virtually all of the policies referenced Alabama Code 32-5A-115 which clearly states that, "The operator of an emergency vehicle is NOT relieved from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons using the highways." The policies were emphatic concerning the safety of all parties in emergency situations. Returned policies covered this issue thoroughly and consistently informed officers to perform duties in accordance with state laws.
With respect to emergency response, a second variable of interest was the coding of emergency calls. Departments coded emergency calls to guide officers and dispatchers in determining the appropriate level of response to various situations. For instance, a Code-1 (Routine) response was defined as a response of a non-emergency nature to a request for service. In this situation, officers would obey all driving regulations and rules of the road as required by law. A Code-2 (Urgent) response indicated an emergency did exist. Examples of Code-2 responses included bank alarms, accidents blocking a roadway and domestic disturbances. Officers were required to respond immediately while observing all traffic laws. A Code-3 (Emergency) response acknowledged a life-threatening situation where officers would respond as quickly and safely as possible with emergency lights in operation and siren activated. Code-3 examples were a person with a weapon, incidents of rape, homicide and robbery, and traffic accidents with injuries.
All returned policies included goals or purpose statements for the policies along with definitions of emergency response and pursuit. A content analysis of those policies revealed a requirement of displaying emergency lights at all times while engaged in an emergency response/pursuit situation, as well as requirements for the officer to establish communications with dispatch. The use of road blocks in pursuit situations was discussed in a majority of the returned policies and was restricted to felony or life threatening incidents specifically.
PURSUIT CONSIDERATIONS
Common factors for pursuit consideration included: weather conditions, type of violation, visibility, pedestrian traffic, type of vehicle (officer's vehicle type and violator's vehicle type), officer familiarity with geographic area, likelihood of success and time of day. Policies from the largest department size (100+ sworn officers) outlined that no highspeed pursuit would be initiated for minor traffic violations, especially when the identity of the violator is known. The violations were generally placed into one of two categories, hazardous and non-hazardous. Examples of hazardous violations included DUI, reckless driving or driving at excessive speed. Non-hazardous violations included equipment violations, registration violations, running red lights and running stop signs. These common factors were evident in those policies perceived as restrictive, somewhat restrictive and not very restrictive.
Another group of common characteristics regarded considerations for the abandonment of a pursuit. These factors existed predominantly in policies perceived as somewhat restrictive and are: officer determines the risk of pursuit to be unwarranted, officer recognizes the futility of the situation (no chance of safely apprehending violator), the darkness or distance between officer and violator, the violator is a juvenile, the violation is a misdemeanor or of a non-violent nature, the identity of violator is known and officer is directed by supervisor to terminate pursuit.
Only one of the 52 returned policies was marked very restrictive. The authors were unable to substantially differentiate this policy from those policies classified as somewhat restrictive. The policy regarded as being very restrictive could have quite easily been considered a somewhat restrictive policy when the common variables were compared. This points out that asking agencies to determine their level of restrictiveness is subject to criticism because agencies may differ in their understanding and coding of levels of restrictiveness. However, the authors were interested in perception and the content analysis of the returned policies revealed this to be the only discrepancy between the authors' and the agencies' perceptions.
Three policies provided some interesting variables not found in any of the other returned policies. One policy perceived as somewhat restrictive involved a department with 12-25 sworn officers. This policy included the officer's physical condition as a criteria for deciding whether to pursue or not. Conditions such as fatigue, (prescription) drug sideeffects and mental or emotional state were given as contributors to risk in a pursuit situation.
A second department with 12-25 sworn officers and a policy perceived as somewhat restrictive included a "common sense factor". This factor was listed as another variable to consider when faced with the decision of whether or not to pursue. This department defined the "common sense factor" in the following statement: the destruction of a $15,000 automobile, loss of life, hospitalization and the liability hazard is not worth the price of a misdemeanor citation or warrant. A simple but effective statement, the "common sense factor" may serve as a valuable reminder to all officers.
One department returned a policy that provided informative details regarding officer and municipality liability. This policy from a department with 12-25 sworn officers was classified as not very restrictive. The policy examined the two Supreme Court cases of City of Canton v. Harris (1989) and Brower v. County of Inyo (1989) wherein the issues of adequate training and seizure through the use of road blocks or ramming were discussed. The policy continued to explain that the police vehicle and its use to terminate a chase or seize an alleged offender can be considered deadly force, which can be subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This was the only returned policy that addressed the issue of liability in an in-depth manner.
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
A total of 188 questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 48 percent. Six department size categories were established to examine the return rate. Department size categories were 0-11, 12-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100 , and 100 or more sworn officers. Previous studies of Alabama law enforcement agencies by one of the authors had suggested that categorizing department sizes in this manner reflects the most suitable department size breakdown for sufficient representative examination. The percentage of return ranged from a high of 100 percent for departments with 100 or more sworn officers to a low of 36 percent for departments with 0-11 sworn officers. It should be noted that there were a total of 255 departments in the 0-11 size range and a total of 11 departments with 100 or more sworn officers.
When asked if the department currently had an emergency response policy, every department size range had at least three-quarters answering Yes. Of the 92 departments with 0-11 sworn officers, 69 (75 percent) had a policy concerning emergency response. Forty-one (82 percent) of 50 departments with 12-25 sworn officers had an emergency response policy. Departments with 26-50 sworn officers had 21 (88 percent) of 24 with an emergency response policy. In the 51-75 size category, only one department reported not having an emergency response policy. Seven (86 percent) of nine stated they had a policy addressing emergency response. All departments with 76-100 sworn officers answered yes, as did 99 percent of the departments with 100 or more sworn officers. It should be noted that there were only 16 departments in these two size ranges. Of the 16 departments, 15 responded to this questionnaire and only one department with 100 or more sworn officers reported not having an emergency response policy.
Departments were asked to give their perception of restrictiveness concerning officer judgment in their emergency response policy (See Table 1 ). The choices were very restrictive, somewhat restrictive, not very restrictive and no restrictions. A very restrictive policy was defined on the questionnaire as one with no use of officer judgment under any circumstances other than a life threatening scenario. A somewhat restrictive policy was defined as one which allows officer judgment depending on the situation (e.g. nature of call, population density, weather conditions etc.). Not very restrictive was defined as having essentially no control over officer judgment except in specific situations such as minor traffic violations or areas of heavy population density. A policy with no restrictions was defined as one which allows total officer judgment in all situations. The respondents were asked to use our definitions in rating the restrictiveness of their policies. Of those departments with 0-11 sworn officers, 45 (65 percent) reported having a somewhat restrictive emergency response policy. This was also the only department size range reporting emergency response policies with no restrictions. Four (6 percent) of the 69 departments reported the existence of an emergency response policy that had no restrictions. Thirty-seven (66 percent) departments with 12-25 sworn officers reported their emergency response policies were somewhat restrictive while 16 (76 percent) of those departments with 26-50 sworn officers reported likewise. In the 51-75 department size range, four (66 percent) of six responding departments reported a somewhat restrictive policy. Of the ten departments with 100 or more sworn officers, eight (80 percent) reported a somewhat restrictive emergency response policy and two (20 percent) reported having a very restrictive policy.
The survey also asked if the department currently had a pursuit policy. Virtually all responding departments answered yes (see Table 2 ). Seventy-nine (86 percent) departments out of 92 in the 0-11 size range reported having a pursuit policy; 48 (96 percent) departments with 12-25 sworn officers reported having a pursuit policy; 23 (96 percent) of 24 departments with 26-50 sworn officers reported the existence of a pursuit policy, and all seven (100 percent) of the departments with 51-75 sworn officers reported having a pursuit policy. All of those within the two largest department size ranges (76-100 sworn officers and 100 or more sworn officers) responded yes to having a pursuit policy.
Respondents were asked to give their perception of restrictiveness concerning officer judgment in their pursuit policies (see Table 3 ). Choices were the same as those used in emergency response. The somewhat restrictive response was reported as the predominant policy type throughout all six department sizes. The 0-11 department size was the only size range reporting a policy with no restrictions, with one (1 percent) out of the 79 responding departments. Of those departments with 12-25 sworn officers, 29 (60 percent) reported having a somewhat restrictive policy and 15 (65 percent) departments with 26-50 sworn officers reported likewise. Five (71 percent) of seven departments with 51-75 sworn officers reported a somewhat restrictive pursuit policy. The largest department size range (100 or more sworn officers) was almost evenly split between very restrictive and somewhat restrictive policy types. Six (55 percent) of the departments reported a somewhat restrictive policy compared to five (45 percent) departments reporting a very restrictive policy.
One question addressed the use of forcible stop techniques (see Table 4 ). Examples of these techniques included in the questionaire were road blocks, boxing in and ramming. Departments with 76-100 sworn officers reported the highest use of forcible stop techniques with three (75 percent) of four responding departments answering yes. However, there were only five departments of this size in the state. Thirty-three (36 percent) of 92 departments with 0-11 sworn officers reported that they allowed the use of forcible stop techniques. Those departments with 12-25 sworn officers reported the use of forcible stop techniques 50 percent American Journal of Police, Vol. XV, No. 4 1996 89 The survey also asked if officers had received formal training on forcible stop techniques (see Table 5 ). The largest amount of reported training was found in those departments with 76-100 sworn officers (75 percent). The least amount of reported training occurred in departments with 100 or more sworn officers, with three (27 percent) of 11 departments indicating their officers had been trained. Forty-five (49 percent) of the departments with 0-11 sworn officers reported training, and 23 (46 percent) of the departments with 12-25 sworn officers reported the same. Of the 24 departments in the 26-50 size range, 14 (58 percent) reported training and three (43 percent) of the seven departments with 51-75 sworn officers indicated likewise. There did not appear to be a direct connection between the number and sizes of agencies that allowed forcible stops and those that provided training. However, the number of agencies that allowed the use of forcible stop techniques was similar to the number of agencies that provided formal training. Two agencies with 12-25 sworn officers reported the use of forcible stops without providing formal training.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this descriptive study was to provide the results of a policy content analysis and survey questionnaire concerning emergency response/pursuit issues involving police and sheriffs' departments in Alabama. The data were used to examine the number of sworn officers in the responding agencies and the existing relationships of certain emergency response/pursuit variables. These variables included department size, current policy, officer judgment, forcible stop techniques and training.
A noteworthy finding of this study was the number of police and sheriffs' departments currently having emergency response/pursuit policies. The data revealed that 80 percent of the responding police and sheriffs' departments in Alabama currently had an emergency response policy. Also, 91 percent of the responding departments currently had a pursuit policy. This may be significant because it indicates that a large majority of the departments were aware of safety and liability concerns inherent in emergency response and pursuit situations. However, the research instrument did not specifically address these "concerns", thus making a definitive statement invalid. It may be suggested that specific guidelines and procedures for use in emergency response/pursuit situations would benefit officers in the decision-making process. If officers were able to reference a policy for guidance and this policy contained effective safety measures, then all citizens could benefit. Nevertheless, all emergency response/pursuit policies indicated as their goal the maximum protection of lives and property for all citizens.
An examination of the reported policy types also yielded significant data. The data clearly showed that a majority of those responding departments having emergency response/pursuit policies classified their policies as being somewhat restrictive. The amount of reported policy restrictiveness may be considered significant because it may represent a desire on behalf of those responding departments to operate with safety as the foremost goal. This may be based on the assumption that as a policy becomes more restrictive, the use of officer discretion decreases, therefore increasing the safety for all parties. One might find this information encouraging in light of the increasing nationwide concern for safety and liability in emergency response/pursuit situations. However, the authors caution that based on personal experience with many of the responding agencies, they may not in all occasions translate policy into practice.
Another finding of this study which may indicate that the majority of police and sheriffs' departments in Alabama are reporting that they are operating with safety in mind was the number of departments that allowed the use of forcible stop techniques in pursuit situations. Less than half (44 percent) of the responding departments reported having policies which allowed the use of forcible stop techniques in pursuit situations.
